<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[Angelina on Cybersecurity]]></title><description><![CDATA[Angelina on Cybersecurity]]></description><link>https://cyberangelina.hashnode.dev</link><generator>RSS for Node</generator><lastBuildDate>Sat, 12 Sep 2026 06:42:12 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://cyberangelina.hashnode.dev/rss.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><ttl>60</ttl><item><title><![CDATA[I Built a Free File Integrity Monitor for Windows (and Why You Should Care About File Tampering)]]></title><description><![CDATA[Somewhere on your machine right now, there's a folder of files you trust. A client's documents. A software package you downloaded. Configuration files. Backup archives. You assume they're exactly as y]]></description><link>https://cyberangelina.hashnode.dev/i-built-a-free-file-integrity-monitor-for-windows-and-why-you-should-care-about-file-tampering</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://cyberangelina.hashnode.dev/i-built-a-free-file-integrity-monitor-for-windows-and-why-you-should-care-about-file-tampering</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Angelina Anisimova]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 01:14:06 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Somewhere on your machine right now, there's a folder of files you trust. A client's documents. A software package you downloaded. Configuration files. Backup archives. You assume they're exactly as you left them.</p>
<p>But are they?</p>
<p>File tampering is quieter than most attacks. A modified DLL in a software installation. A document with a changed field. A deleted log. These changes don't announce themselves. You won't see a warning. Your antivirus probably won't flag them either, because nothing "malicious" happened in the traditional sense. A file just... changed.</p>
<p>That gap is the problem I wanted to solve.</p>
<hr />
<p><strong>What the File Integrity Monitor does</strong></p>
<p>I built a small Windows desktop tool called File Integrity Monitor. It does one thing well: it tells you whether the files in a folder have changed between two points in time.</p>
<p>The workflow is three steps:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>Scan a folder and take a snapshot. The tool records a SHA-256 fingerprint for every file.</p>
</li>
<li><p>Come back later (or after an event you want to verify, like installing software).</p>
</li>
<li><p>Run a check. Modified files appear in yellow, new files in green, deleted files in red.</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p>That's the entire feature set. No accounts. No dashboards. No subscriptions.</p>
<hr />
<p><strong>Why SHA-256 matters here</strong></p>
<p>A file's name, size, and timestamp can all be faked or unchanged even when its contents have been altered. SHA-256 hashes the actual contents of the file into a unique 64-character string. If a single byte changes, the hash changes. It's the same mechanism used to verify software downloads on official distribution pages.</p>
<p>This is not a novelty. It's the same principle behind enterprise file integrity monitoring products like Tripwire. This tool just makes it accessible without a license fee or a security team.</p>
<hr />
<p><strong>Who this is actually for</strong></p>
<p>You don't need to be in IT to have a use for this.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>You received a USB drive from a vendor and want to verify nothing changed after you handed it back.</p>
</li>
<li><p>You installed a piece of software and want to confirm it only touched the files it should have.</p>
</li>
<li><p>You're managing legal or medical documents and need to know whether anything was modified since last week.</p>
</li>
<li><p>You're a freelancer delivering files to a client and want a verifiable record of what you sent.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p>None of these scenarios require a SIEM or an enterprise budget.</p>
<hr />
<p><strong>Your files stay on your machine</strong></p>
<p>The tool runs locally. No internet connection, no cloud sync, no telemetry. The snapshot saves as a JSON file in the same folder as the app. Nothing leaves your computer.</p>
<hr />
<p><strong>Getting it running</strong></p>
<p>Honest answer: if you're comfortable running a Python script, this takes about two minutes. If you're not, the README walks you through installing Python step by step, or you can build a standalone <code>.exe</code> using PyInstaller so no Python installation is needed at all.</p>
<p>The entire application is a single file. There are no external dependencies, no <code>pip install</code> requirements, nothing to configure.</p>
<hr />
<p><strong>The code is open</strong></p>
<p>It's MIT licensed on GitHub. Read it, modify it, use it in your own projects. If you want to add scheduled scans, email alerts, or exclusion rules for certain file types, those are the next things I'm planning to build.</p>
<p>If you find it useful or spot something I should fix, open an issue or leave a comment below.</p>
<p><a href="https://github.com/angelinaanisimova/file-integrity-monitor">https://github.com/angelinaanisimova/file-integrity-monitor</a></p>
]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Security Failures I Noticed Before I Knew What Security Was]]></title><description><![CDATA[Before I ever opened a cybersecurity textbook, I was standing behind a front desk in a medical clinic, watching a patient lean over my computer monitor to read the appointment schedule.
My reaction wa]]></description><link>https://cyberangelina.hashnode.dev/the-security-failures-i-noticed-before-i-knew-what-security-was</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://cyberangelina.hashnode.dev/the-security-failures-i-noticed-before-i-knew-what-security-was</guid><category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category><category><![CDATA[HIPAA]]></category><category><![CDATA[grc]]></category><category><![CDATA[healthcare]]></category><category><![CDATA[#infosec]]></category><dc:creator><![CDATA[Angelina Anisimova]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 22:16:01 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://cdn.hashnode.com/uploads/covers/6a0e038f8b03460221a6e298/b6e3e988-e5ea-4ffa-af6c-cbd8e45ab3c3.jpg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Before I ever opened a cybersecurity textbook, I was standing behind a front desk in a medical clinic, watching a patient lean over my computer monitor to read the appointment schedule.</p>
<p>My reaction was immediate and visceral: get away from my screen.</p>
<p>I didn't have language for what I was feeling. I hadn't heard the term "shoulder surfing" yet. I didn't know that HIPAA has an entire pillar dedicated to physical safeguards, or that an exposed scheduling system constitutes a potential unauthorized disclosure of protected health information. I just knew, instinctively, that something was wrong — that a stranger reading what was on my screen was a problem that I needed to stop.</p>
<p>That gut feeling turned out to be correct. It just took studying for a cybersecurity career to understand exactly why.</p>
<hr />
<h2>What HIPAA Actually Says About Physical Security</h2>
<p>Most people, when they hear HIPAA, think about data breaches, encryption, and breach notification letters. The conversation almost always goes straight to technology. But the HIPAA Security Rule is built on three pillars, not one: administrative safeguards, technical safeguards, and physical safeguards.</p>
<p>Physical safeguards — codified under 45 CFR §164.310 — cover things like workstation use policies, device and media controls, and facility access controls. The regulation requires covered entities to implement policies that govern how workstations are used and positioned, who can physically access systems that store electronic PHI, and how unauthorized access is prevented.</p>
<p>Shoulder surfing is a direct threat to all of that.</p>
<p>A medical scheduling system doesn't just show appointment times. It shows patient names, dates of birth, provider names, appointment types — sometimes the reason for the visit. In a fertility clinic, an oncology practice, or a mental health office, that last field alone is deeply sensitive. A patient glancing at a screen in passing might see nothing they'd recognize as significant. Or they might see a neighbor's name next to a diagnosis code. Either way, the covered entity just had an unauthorized disclosure — and there's no technical control in the world that prevents someone from reading a screen you left open and unattended.</p>
<hr />
<h2>The Password on the Sticky Note</h2>
<p>Here's the other thing I saw, regularly: staff writing their login credentials on paper.</p>
<p>Not maliciously. Not carelessly in any conscious sense. They were writing them down because they were working a 9-hour shift, managing phone calls and patient check-ins simultaneously, and the alternative — getting locked out and waiting for an IT reset — cost them time they didn't have. A written password on a notepad tucked under the keyboard was faster. So that's what they did.</p>
<p>This is also a physical safeguard failure. HIPAA's access control requirements under §164.312 mandate that covered entities implement technical policies to allow only authorized persons to access ePHI — but a credential written on a slip of paper that anyone walking behind the desk can read defeats every technical control upstream of it. The password complexity policy, the multi-factor authentication, the role-based permissions — all of it becomes irrelevant the moment the credential is physically exposed.</p>
<p>But here's what I didn't understand at the time, and what I think gets missed in most compliance conversations: the staff weren't the problem. The workflow was.</p>
<hr />
<h2>Security Failures Are Usually Systems Problems</h2>
<p>If your staff are writing passwords on paper, the correct diagnosis is not "staff need more training." The correct diagnosis is "the authentication process creates enough friction that staff have found a workaround, and no one has addressed the workaround."</p>
<p>This is the part of GRC — governance, risk, and compliance — that I find genuinely interesting. Rules without usable processes don't get followed. They get bypassed, quietly and consistently, by people who are just trying to do their jobs. A good security program accounts for human behavior. It asks: what does this control actually look like on the floor, at 8:45 AM, when the waiting room is full?</p>
<p>The controls that would actually help in a clinical front-desk environment are not exotic. Privacy filters on monitors facing patient areas. Screen lock policies that trigger after 60–90 seconds of inactivity. A password manager that removes the memory burden without adding login friction. A clean desk policy that's actually enforced, not just mentioned in onboarding. Periodic physical walk-throughs as part of a risk assessment, not just a checkbox on an audit form.</p>
<p>None of those are technically complicated. All of them require someone to understand what the floor looks like — to have been inside the environment they're trying to secure.</p>
<hr />
<h2>Why I'm Telling This Story</h2>
<p>I'm moving into cybersecurity. I have my CompTIA Security+, Pentest+, and a handful of other certifications. I'm building labs, doing CTFs, working toward a career in GRC or security analysis in the healthcare space.</p>
<p>But the reason I'm drawn to this work isn't the certs. It's that I spent years inside an environment where I could see the gap between what the policy said and what actually happened — and I cared about closing it even before I had a name for what I was trying to do.</p>
<p>Healthcare security is hard because the stakes on both sides are real. If you lock down access too aggressively, patient care suffers. If you don't lock it down enough, patient privacy does. Getting that balance right requires people who understand both sides of the desk.</p>
<p>I've been on one of those sides. I'm training for the other.</p>
<hr />
<p><em>Angelina Anisimova is a cybersecurity professional in training, currently pursuing her first role in GRC and healthcare security after graduating from Western Governors University. She holds seven certifications and previously worked as a Medical Assistant.</em></p>
<p><em>Connect on</em> <a href="https://linkedin.com/in/angelina-cybersecurity"><em>LinkedIn</em></a> <em>|</em> <a href="https://github.com/angelinaanisimova"><em>GitHub</em></a> <em>|</em> <a href="https://tryhackme.com/p/cyberangelina"><em>TryHackMe</em></a></p>
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